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708 TOLMAN v. UNDERHILL [39 C.2d 
[Sac. No. 6211. In Bank. Oct. 17, 1952.] 
EDWARD C. TOLMAN et al., Petitioners, v. ROBERT M. 
UNDERHILL, as Secretary and Treasurer of the Re-
gents of the University of California et al., Respondents. 
[1] Universities-Powers and Duties-Legislative ControL-Laws 
passed by the Legislature under its general police power will 
prevail over regulations made by the Regents of the University 
of California with regard to matters which are not exclusively 
university affairs. 
[2] Id.- Powers and Duties- Legislative Control.-Loyalty of 
teachers at the state university is not merely a matter in-
volving the internal affairs of that institution, but is a subject 
of general statewide concern. 
[3] Id.-Powers and Duties-Legislative Control.-Constitutional 
limitations on the Legislature's power are to be strictly con-
strued, and any doubt as to its paramount authority to require 
University of California employees to take an oath of loyalty 
to the state and federal Constitutions will be resolved in favor 
of its action. 
[4] Municipal Corporations- Local Regulations- Conflict With 
Statute.-Although the adoption of local rules supplementary 
to state law is proper under some circumstances, local regula-
tion is invalid if it attempts to impose additional requirements 
in a field which is fully occupied by statute. 
[5] Id.-Local Regulations-Conflict With Statute.-Determina-
tion of the question whether the Legislature has undertaken 
to occupy exclusively a given field of legislation d·epends on an 
analysis of the statute and a consideration of the facts and 
circumstances on which it was intended to operate. 
[6] Id.-Local Regulations-Conflicts With Statute.-Where the 
Legislature has adopted statutes governing a particular sub-
ject matter, its intent with regard to occupying the field to the 
exclusion of all local regulation is not to be measured alone by 
the language used, but by the whole purpose and scope of the 
legislative scheme. 
[7] Public Employees-Oath-Rules Governing.-Where the Legis-
lature has enacted a general and detailed scheme requiring all 
state employees to execute a prescribed oath relating to loyalty 
[ 1] See Cal.Jur., Universities and Colleges, § 2 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Universities and Colleges, § 6 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-3] Universities, § 8; [ 4-6] Municipal 
Corporations, § 237; [7, 8] Public Employees. 
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and faithful performance of duty, it could not have intended 
that they must at the same time remain subject to any such 
additional loyalty oaths or declarations as the particular 
agency employing them might see fit to impose. 
[8] !d.-Oath-Rules Governing.-Where state legislation has 
fully occupied the field of legislation involving loyalty oaths 
of all state employees, university personnel cannot properly 
be required to execute any other oath or declaration relating 
to loyalty, and an additional declaration as to loyalty required 
by Regents of the University of California is therefore in-
valid. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel Board of Regents 
of University of California to issue letters of appointment 
to positions as members of faculty for academic year. Writ 
granted. 
Stanley .A. Weigel for Petitioners. 
Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, Eugene M. Prince and Francis 
R. Kirkham for Respondents. 
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and Gerald G. Kelly, 
.Assistant County Counsel, as .Amici Curiae on behalf of Re-
spondents. 
GIBSON, C. J.-This is an original proceeding in man-
damus to compel the Regents of the University of California, 
through their secretary, Underhill, to issue to each petitioner 
a letter of appointment to his regular post on the faculty of 
the university. 
On .April 21, 1950, the regents passed a resolution which 
provided that, effective with the academic year beginning 
July 1st, "conditions precedent to employment or renewal 
of employment of .American citizens in the University shall 
be (1) execution of the constitutional oath of office required 
of public officials of the State of California and (2) accept-
ance of appointment by a letter which shall include the follow-
ing provision : 
'' 'Having taken the constitutional oath of office required 
of public officials of the State of California, I hereby formally 
acknowledge my acceptance of the position and salary named, 
and also state that I am not a member of the Communist Party 
or any other organization which advocates the overthrow of 
the Government by force or violence, and that I have no com-
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mitments in conflict with my responsibilities with respect to 
impartial scholarship and free pursuit of truth. I understand 
that the foregoing statement is a condition of my employment 
and a consideration of payment of my salary.' '' 
Petitioners have taken an oath identical to that prescribed 
in section 3 of article XX of the state Constitution, as re-
quired of all state employees by sections 18150 et seq. of the 
Government Code.* However, when notified of their ap-
pointment to their regular position on the faculty for the 
academic year, petitioners refused to execute letters of accept-
ance in the form required by the resolution and have brought 
the present proceeding claiming that the requirement is in-
valid. 
We need not di13cuss the numerous questions raised by peti-
tioners with regard to alleged violation of their civil rights 
and impairment of contract because we are satisfied that their 
application for relief must be granted on the ground that state 
legislation has fully occupied the field and that university 
personnel cannot properly be required to execute any other 
oath or declaration relating to loyalty than that prescribed 
for all state employees. 
The historical background of the established practice of 
limiting the number and types of oaths and tests which may 
be required as a qualification for public employment has been 
discussed in our opinion in Pockrnan v. Leonard, ante, p. 
-- [249 P.2d 267]. In California our Constitution has always 
provided that members of the Legislature and all executive 
and judicial officers, except such inferior officers as may be 
exempted by law, shall take the oath now set out in section 
3 of article XX, and that ''no other oath, declaration or test, 
shall be required as a qualification for any office or public 
trust.'' The state Legislature has never exempted any public 
officer or employee from taking the constitutional oath but, 
to the contrary, has expressly provided that it shall be re-
quired of every state employee and, by a series of statutes, has 
enacted a general and comprehensive scheme relating to execu-
tion and filing of the oath by all such persons. 
*The oath prescribed by section 3 of article XX is as follows: "I do 
solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be) that I will support 
the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the 
State of California, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties 
of the office of --, according to the best of my ability." 
Gov. Code, § 18150 et seq. provides that an identical oath shall be taken 
by all state employees. 
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Section 1360 of the Government Code provides that before 
any officer enters on the duties of his office he shall take and 
subscribe to an oath which is identical with that set forth in 
section 3, article XX of the Constitution. (Enacted 1943. 
Based on former Pol. Code, § 904, [ 1872].) Section 1364 
makes it unlawful to remove a person "from an office or posi-
tion of public trust'' because of his failure to comply with any 
law, charter or regulation prescribing an additional test or 
qualification, other than tests and qualifications provided for 
under civil service and retirement laws, if he has taken or 
offers to take the oath prescribed by section 1360. And sec-
tion 1365 states that an officer cannot lawfully be removed 
from office because of his refusal to require additional tests or 
qualifications of persons he appoints to positions of public 
trust. (Enacted 1943. Based on Stats. 1901, ch. 167, p. 552.) 
In 1941 the Legislature enacted laws requiring all state em-
ployees, whether members or nonmembers of civil service, to 
take an oath identical with the constitutional oath ( Stats. 
1941, ch. 159, p. 1199 and ch. 236, p. 1302), and this require-
ment was incorporated into the Government Code as sections 
18150 et seq. in 1945. Section 18152 provides, as to nonmem-
bers of civil service, that the manner of taking and filing the 
oath required by section 18150 shall be the same as is pro-
vided for oaths taken pursuant to section 1360, and section 
18154 provides that refusal to take the oath shall result in 
forfeiture of position. As to members of civil service, section 
18153 prescribes the manner of taking and filing the oath, 
section 18155 provides that refusal to take the oath shall be 
grounds for dismissal, and section 18156 states that every 
civil service employee who takes the oath within the time pre-
scribed by sections 18150 et seq. "is conclusively presumed 
to have been and to be legally holding his position as far as 
1aws requiring him to take, subscribe, or file an oath are 
concerned.''* 
Respondents contend that state legislation like sections 
1360 et seq. and 18150 et seq. of the Government Code is in-
applicable to university personnel because of that portion of 
*The provisions of §§ 18150-18158 were superseded in 1950 by Gov-
ernment Code §§ 3103-3109, commonly known as the Levering Act, which 
requires all city, county and state employees to take a loyalty oath which is 
substantially the same as the constitutional oath. (See Packman v. Leon-
ard, ante, p. 676 [249 P.2d 267].) The act did not go into effect until 
Heveral months after the filing of the present proceeding, aud the ques-
tion of its operation is not directly involved in this case. ( Cf. Fraser v. 
Regents of University of California, post, p. 717 [249 P.2d 283].) 
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section 9 of article IX of the state Constitution which provides 
that the University of California shall be administered by 
the regents, ''with full powers of organization and govern-
ment, subject only to such legislative control as may be neces-
sary to insure compliance with the terms of the endowments 
of the university and the security of its funds.'' [1] It is well 
settled, however, that laws passed by the Legislature under its 
general police power will prevail over regulations made by 
the regents with regard to matters which are not exclusively 
university affairs. (See Wallace v. Regents of University of 
California, 75 Cal.App. 274, 278 [242 P. 892]; Williams v. 
Wheeler, 23 Cal.App. 619,624-625 [138 P. 937].) [2] There 
can be no question that the loyalty of teachers at the uni-
versity is not merely a matter involving the internal affairs 
of that institution but is a subject of general statewide con-
cern. [3] Constitutional limitations upon the Legislature's 
powers are to be strictly construed, and any doubt as to its 
paramount authority to require University of California em-
ployees to take an oath of loyalty to the state and federal 
Constitutions will be resolved in favor of its action. ( Cf. 
Collins v. Riley, 24 Cal.2d 912, 915-916 [152 P.2d 169] .) 
[ 4] Although the adoption of local rules supplementary 
to state law is proper under some circumstances, it is well 
settled that local regulation is invalid if it attempts to impose 
additional requirements in a field which is fully occupied by 
statute. (Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal.2d 366, 370-371 [125 P.2d 
482, 147 A.L.R. 5151 ; Eastlick v. C1:ty of Los Angeles, 29 Cal. 
2d 661, 666 [177 P.2d 558, 170 A.L.R. 225].) [5] Determi-
nation of the question whether the Legislature has undertaken 
to occupy exclusively a given field of legislation depends upon 
an analysis of the statute and a consideration of the facts 
and circumstances upon which it was intended to operate. 
(Eastlick v. City of Los Angeles, snpra, 29 Cal.2d at p. 666; 
Pipoly v. Benson, supra, 20 Ca1.2d at pp. 372-375; In re Iver-
son, 199 Cal. 582, 586-587 [250 P. 681] ; Ex parte Daniels, 
183 Cal. 636, 642, 643 [192 P. 442, 21 A.L.R. 1172].) 
[6] · Where the lJegislatnre has adopted statutes governing a 
particular snbject matter, itR intent with regard to occupying 
the field to the exclusion of all local regulation is not to be 
measured alone by the language used but by the whole pur-
pose and scope of the legislative scheme. (Eastlick v. City of 
Los Angeles, sttpra, 29 Ca1.2d at p. 666; Pipoly v. Benson, 
supra, 20 Cal.2d at 371-373; Ex parte Daniels, st~pra, 183 Cal. 
at p. 642-643.) \\ 
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[7] It is immediately apparent, upon applying these tests 
to the statutes here involved, that the loyalty of state em-
ployees is not a matter as to which there may reasonably be 
different standards and different tests but is, without doubt, 
a subject requiring uniform treatment throughout the state. 
As we have already seen, the Legislature has enacted a general 
and detailed scheme requiring all state employees to execute 
a prescribed oath relating to loyalty and faithful perform-
ance of duty, and it could not have intended that they must 
at the same time remain subject to any such additional loyalty 
oaths or declarations as the particular agency employing 
them might see fit to impose. Multiplicity and duplication 
of oaths and declarations would not only reflect seriously upon 
the dignity of state employment but would make a travesty 
of the effort to secure loyal and suitable persons for govern-
ment service. 
[8] We are satisfied that the Legislature intended to 
occupy this particular field of legislation by enacting Govern-
ment Code sections 1360 et seq. and 18150 et seq. and that 
there is no room left for supplementary local regulation. 
(Of. Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal.2d 366, 371, 373 [125 P.2d 
482, 147 A.L.R. 515] ; Eastlick v. City of Los Angeles, 29 Cal. 
2d 661, 666-667 [177 P.2d 558, 170 A.L.R. 225].) The decla-
ration as to loyalty required by the regents is, accordingly, in-
valid. 
No question is raised as to petitioners' loyalty or as to 
their qualifications to teach, and they are entitled to a writ 
directing respondents to issue to each of petitioners a letter 
of appointment to his post on the faculty of the university 
upon his taking the oath now required of all public employees 
by the Levering Act. (See Fraser v. Regents of University 
of California, post, p. 717 [249 P.2d 283].) 
Let a writ of mandate issue for the limited purpose above 
indicated. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Pock-
man v. Leonard, this day filed, ante, p. 688 [249 P.2d 267], 
I would issue a writ of mandate as prayed for in the petition. 
